What is the value of sell-side analysts? Evidence from coverage initiations and terminations

Journal of Accounting and Economics
Volume 60, Issues 2–3, November–December 2015, Pages 141–160

What is the value of sell-side analysts? Evidence from coverage initiations and terminations

Kevin K. Lia, Haifeng Youb

Management Forecast对于股市的影响。
(1) Initiations和terminations有影响
(2) changes in information asymmetry 不一定


Abstract
We investigate three potential channels of analyst value creation: improving fundamental performance through monitoring, reducing information asymmetry, and increasing investor recognition. We show that changes in investor recognition have consistent explanatory power for the market reaction to coverage initiations and terminations but find mixed evidence for changes in information asymmetry and no evidence for changes in fundamental performance as determinants of the market reaction. These results suggest that analysts create value for firms under their coverage by improving their investor recognition and not by monitoring or reducing information asymmetry.

On guidance and volatility

Journal of Accounting and Economics

Volume 60, Issues 2–3, November–December 2015, Pages 161–180

Mary Brooke Billingsa, Robert Jenningsb, Baruch Lev

讨论management guidance到底增加还是减少volatility。这文说是减少。

Abstract

In contrast to theoretical and empirical evidence linking disclosure to information environment benefits, recent research concludes that guidance increases volatility, but leaves open the question of whether volatility plays a role in prompting the issuance of guidance. Consistent with the notion that managers react to rising volatility by providing guidance, we document a link between abnormal run-ups in volatility and the decision to issue a forecast after controlling for the market’s ability to anticipate the guidance. Upon disentangling pre-guidance volatility changes from post-guidance volatility changes, we find no evidence that guidance increases volatility. Indeed, our evidence consistently supports the view that managers seek to and do mitigate share price volatility with guidance.

Interaction between Accounting Standards and Monetary Policy: The Effect of SFAS 115.

Interaction between Accounting Standards and Monetary Policy: The Effect of SFAS 115.

Authors:
Meder, Anthony A.
Source:
Accounting Review. Sep2015, Vol. 90 Issue 5, p2031-2056. 26p. 8 Charts, 1 Graph.

以前的研究表面，货币政策和银行的loan growth成反比关系，并且持有security的话，会减缓这种副相关。
Tony发现，HTM securities和loan growth的负相关更大（因为HTM流动性差）。
另外，小银行受到的影响比大银行大。

I examine the effect of marketable security holdings on monetary policy when those securities are classified under SFAS 115. Prior research has shown that loan growth is negatively related to monetary contractions, and that marketable security holdings mitigate that negative relationship. Those studies consider the securities in aggregate; I am the first to consider the securities classification in conjunction with monetary policy. I ask whether held-to-maturity securities, relative to non-held-to- maturity securities, are negatively related to loan growth. I find that the held-to-maturity securities are more negatively related to loan growth, relative to non-held-to-maturity securities. I also find that held-to-maturity securities are incrementally more negatively related to loan growth during monetary tightening, relative to non-tightening times. Finally, I find that both of these effects are stronger for small banks, relative to large banks. Given the findings, I conclude that held-to-maturity securities actually enhance, not mitigate, the effect of monetary tightening on bank lending.

CEO Contractual Protection and Managerial Short-Termism.

CEO Contractual Protection and Managerial Short-Termism.

Authors:
Xia Chen1
Qiang Cheng1
Lo, Alvis K.2
Xin Wang3

Source:
Accounting Review. Sep2015, Vol. 90 Issue 5, p1871-1906. 36p. 9 Charts.

有合同保护的那些CEO，不太会有real earnings management的行为(比如砍掉R&D)之类。


How to address managerial short-termism is an important issue for companies, regulators, and researchers. We examine the effect of CEO contractual protection, in the form of employment agreements and severance pay agreements, on managerial short-termism. We find that firms with CEO contractual protection are less likely to cut R&D expenditures to avoid earnings decreases and are less likely to engage in real earnings management. The effect of CEO contractual protection is both statistically and economically significant. We further find that this effect increases with the duration and monetary strength of CEO contractual protection. The cross-sectional analyses indicate that the effect is stronger for firms in more homogeneous industries and for firms with higher transient institutional ownership, as protection is particularly important for CEOs in these firms, and is stronger when there are weaker alternative monitoring mechanisms.

Size and Book-to-Market Factors in Earnings and Returns

Size and Book-to-Market Factors in
Earnings and Returns
EUGENE F. FAMA and KENNETH R. FRENCH*

You have free access to this content
The Journal of Finance
Volume 50, Issue 1

Size和Market-to-book ratio对于profitability的解释力。

ABSTRACT
We study whether the behavior of stock prices, in relation to size and book-to-market-equity
(BE/ME), reflects the behavior of earnings. Consistent with rational
pricing, high BE/ME signals persistent poor earnings and low BE/ME signals
strong earnings. Moreover, stock prices forecast the reversion of earnings growth
observed after firms are ranked on size and BE/ME. Finally, there are market, size,
and BE/ME factors in earnings like those in returns. The market and size factors
in earnings help explain those in returns, but we find no link between BE/ME
factors in earnings and returns.

The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns

EUGENE F. FAMA,

KENNETH R. FRENCH

JF Volume 47, Issue 2

June 1992 

Pages 427–465

控制了Size和Market-to-Book Ratio, β 就没什么解释力了。

Two easily measured variables, size and book-to-market equity, combine to capture the cross-sectional variation in average stock returns associated with market β, size, leverage, book-to-market equity, and earnings-price ratios. Moreover, when the tests allow for variation in β that is unrelated to size, the relation between market β and average return is flat, even when β is the only explanatory variable.

Asymmetric timeliness of earnings, market-to-book and conservatism in financial reporting

Asymmetric timeliness of earnings, market-to-book and conservatism in financial reporting

Sugata Roychowdhury, Ross L. Watts

Journal of Accounting and Economics 44 (2007) 2–31

Market-to-book ratio原来也有当conservatism proxy的时候，它和寻常人们用的Basu的那个earnings timeliness proxy不完全一致。在两种情形下，他们成正比或反比。

是Sloan的大牛写的，有空在翻出来看看。


Using an accounting conservatism theory that reflects accounting’s role in practice, we investigate the relation between two extensively used measures of conservatism: asymmetric timeliness of earnings and the market-to-book ratio (MTB). We predict and observe that when asymmetric timeliness is measured cumulatively over long periods, its relation with end-of-period MTB is positive. When asymmetric timeliness is measured over short periods, its dependence on beginning of-period composition of equity value (EV) is responsible for its negative association with MTB. Further, asymmetric timeliness appears to measure conservatism more efficiently when it is estimated cumulatively over multiple periods.

Discussion of ‘‘Asymmetric timeliness of earnings, market-to-book and conservatism in financial reporting’’

Anne Beatty

这文还有一篇discussion。

Finance Research Letters

Volume 3, Issue 4, December 2006, Pages 253–266

On the relation between the market-to-book ratio, growth opportunity, and leverage ratio

Long Chena, Xinlei Zhao

Market-to-book ratio和leverage ratio成反比。

Abstract

The negative relation between the market-to-book ratio and leverage ratio is one of the most widely documented empirical regularities in the capital structure literature. Most related studies take this negative relation as given and debate about its economic interpretation. We show that firms with higher market-to-book ratios face lower debt financing costs and borrow more. The relation between the market-to-book ratio and leverage ratio is not monotonic and is positive for most firms (more than 88% of COMPUSTAT firms and more than 95% of total market capitalization). The previously documented negative relation is driven by a subset of firms with high market-to-book ratios.

Earnings Restatements, Changes in CEO Compensation, and Firm Performance

TAR(2008) Volume 83, Issue 5 (September 2008)

Qiang Cheng, David B. Farber

University of Wisconsin–Madison

University of Missouri

Restatement过后，CEO Compensation中的Option比重会下降，公司业绩会提高。

ABSTRACT: Prior research finds that earnings restatements are linked to CEOs’ excessive option-based compensation and equity holdings. In this paper, we investigate whether firms that experience earnings restatements recontract with their CEOs to reduce their option-based compensation and if so, whether this leads to improved firm performance. Based on 289 restatement firms over the period 1997–2001, we find that the proportion of CEOs’ compensation in the form of options declines significantly in the two years following the restatement. Furthermore, we document that this reduction is accompanied by a decrease in the riskiness of investments, as reflected in lower stock return volatility and subsequent improvements in operating performance. Our results suggest that a decrease in option-based compensation reduces CEOs’ incentives to take excessively risky investments, resulting in improved profitability. Overall, our findings provide insights into the design and efficacy of CEO compensation contracts.

Board leadership structure and CEO turnover

Board leadership structure and CEO turnover
Journal of Corporate Finance
Volume 8, Issue 1, January 2002, Pages 49–66


Vidhan K. Goyal, Chul W. Park

如果CEO和chairman是一个人，就很难被炒掉。

We study whether bestowing chief executive officer (CEO) and board chairman duties on one individual affects a boards decision to dismiss an ineffective CEO. The results show that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is significantly lower when the CEO and chairman duties are vested in the same individual. These results are consistent with the view that the lack of independent leadership in firms that combine the CEO and Chairman positions makes it difficult for the board to remove poorly performing managers.

Determinants of CEO Pay:A Comparison of ExecuComp and Non-ExecuComp Firms.

Determinants of CEO Pay:A Comparison of ExecuComp and Non-ExecuComp Firms.
(TAR, 2010)

Cadman, Brian
Klasa, Sandy
Matsunaga, Steve

在不在Execucomp数据库的两种公司，是不同哒！

We document that firms included in the ExecuComp database tend to be larger, more complex, followed by more analysts, have greater stock liquidity levels, and have higher total, but less concentrated, institutional ownership than other firms. Based on these differences, we test and find support for three predictions. First, ExecuComp firms rely more heavily on earnings and stock returns in determining CEO cash compensation. Second, the weight on earnings is more sensitive to differences in the extent of growth opportunities for ExecuComp firms. Third, the positive relation between institutional ownership concentration and the value of stock option grants is stronger for ExecuComp firms. Overall, our results suggest that ExecuComp and non-ExecuComp firms operate in different contracting environments that lead to differences in the design of their executive compensation contracts. As a result, care should be taken in extending results based on ExecuComp samples to non-ExecuComp firms.

2 projects so far

对于Time Series中Market reaction对earnings surprise的变化，他认识是information leaking，而不是什么block holder不交易，或者高频交易。

Ex-date本来就没什么可做的。Shishir的研究有意思。

Signaling, Investment Opportunities, and Dividend Announcements

1. Pyung Sig Yoon and 
2. Laura T. Starks

Rev. Financ. Stud. (1995) 8 (4):995-1018.

发现股利增加（减少）和Capital Expenditure增加（减少）有关。

另外，股利变化和Analysts的预测变化有关。

比较了两种理论：

(1) cash flow signaling hypothesis是说，Dividend预测未来profitability方向
(2) free cash flow hypothesis正相反。Dividend升高，说明纠正了之间的Overinvestment，减少说明要有无用的investment增加。

文章支持第一种观点。（他们还比较了Tobin's q）

This article examines potential explanations for the wealth effects surrounding dividend change announcements. We find that new information concerning managers’ investment policies is not revealed at the time of the dividend announcement. We also find that dividend increases (decreases) are associated with subsequent significant increases (decreases) in capital expenditures over the three years following the dividend change, and that dividend change announcements are associated with revisions in analysts’ forecasts of current earnings. These results are consistent with the cash flow signaling hypothesis rather than the free cash flow hypothesis as an explanation for the observed stock price reactions to dividend change announcements.

The informativeness of earnings and management’s issuance of earnings forecasts

The informativeness of earnings and management’s issuance of earnings forecasts
Journal of Accounting and Economics 42 (2006) 439–458

Clive S. Lennox, Chul W. Park

ERC越显著的公司，公司越倾向发布Forecasts.

Theory suggests that managers issue earnings forecasts to reduce information asymmetry. An earnings forecast is more effective in reducing information asymmetry if it contains earnings news that is relatively more informative about the firm’s value. We hypothesize that a manager is more likely to issue an earnings forecast if investors perceive that earnings are more informative. We measure earnings informativeness by estimating the firm’s earnings response coefficient (ERC) in quarters prior to the forecast issuance decision. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the firm’s historic ERC is positively associated with management’s issuance of earnings forecasts.

The changing time-series properties of earnings, cash flows and accruals: Has financial reporting become more conservative?

The changing time-series properties of earnings, cash flows and accruals: Has financial reporting become more conservative?
Journal of Accounting and Economics 29 (2000) 287-320

Dan Givoly, Carla Hayn

会计报表是不是越来越保守了？
文章结论：是。

This paper documents changes in the patterns of earnings, cash flows and accruals over the last four decades. In the absence of a generally accepted definition of conservatism, a number of measures of reporting conservatism are identified and examined. These measures rely on the accumulation of nonoperating accruals, the timeliness of earnings with respect to bad and good news, characteristics of the earnings distribution and the market-to-book ratio. The patterns are consistent with an increase in conservative financial reporting over time. The findings have implications for accounting standard setting, regulation of financial information and financial statement analysis.

Payout policy in the 21st century

Payout policy in the 21st century
Journal of Financial Economics 77 (2005) 483–527

Alon Brava, John R. Grahama, Campbell R. Harvey, Roni Michaely

这是一个Survey Paper，讲的是CFOs对于发股利或者股票回购的看法。

We survey 384 financial executives and conduct in-depth interviews with an additional 23 to determine the factors that drive dividend and share repurchase decisions. Our findings indicate that maintaining the dividend level is on par with investment decisions, while repurchases are made out of the residual cash flow after investment spending. Perceived stability of future earnings still affects dividend policy as in Lintner (1956. American Economic Review 46, 97–113). However, 50 years later, we find that the link between dividends and earnings has weakened. Many managers now favor repurchases because they are viewed as being more flexible than dividends and can be used in an attempt to time the equity market or to increase earnings per share. Executives believe that institutions are indifferent between dividends and repurchases and that payout policies have little impact on their investor clientele. In general, management views provide little support for agency, signaling, and clientele hypotheses of payout policy. Tax considerations play a secondary role.

Measure Freq. in IBES Management Forecast

Measure
Measure	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Frequency	Cumulative Percent
CPX	36285	12.59	36285	12.59
DPS	2252	0.78	38537	13.37
EBS	80	0.03	38617	13.40
EBT	10980	3.81	49597	17.21
EPS	105561	36.63	155158	53.84
FFO	5479	1.90	160637	55.74
GPS	9482	3.29	170119	59.03
GRM	13391	4.65	183510	63.68
NET	8852	3.07	192362	66.75
OPR	3935	1.37	196297	68.11
PRE	1196	0.41	197493	68.53
ROA	83	0.03	197576	68.56
ROE	544	0.19	198120	68.75
SAL	90073	31.25	288193	100.00
SALPAR	1	0.00	288194	100.00

Economic Freedom, Investment Flexibility, and Equity Value: A Cross-Country Study.

Economic Freedom, Investment Flexibility, and Equity Value: A Cross-Country Study.
TAR(2015)

Chih-Ying Chen
Chen, Peter F.
Qinglu Jin

也是一个ECON论文啊？
经济自由的国家，各种好。
convex relation是什么？心累。

Prior studies show that equity value has convex relations with earnings and book value of equity, respectively, due to growth and adaptation options (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997a; Zhang 2000). However, these studies do not consider the role of institutions in affecting firms' ability to exercise growth and adaptation options. In this study, we investigate whether these convex relations vary with the degree of a country's economic freedom, which may influence the frictions and costs of exercising these options. We develop four hypotheses: In countries with greater economic freedom: (1) a firm's capital investment in response to profitability is greater; (2) the relation between equity value and earnings, given equity book value, is more convex; (3) the relation between equity value and equity book value, given earnings, is more convex; and (4) the relation between stock return and profitability change is more convex. Using the Economic Freedom of the World index from the Fraser Institute, we test our hypotheses with data from 30 countries during the 2000-2010 period. The empirical results are consistent with these hypotheses. The effect of economic freedom that we document is distinct from the effects of GDP level and growth, legal origin, law enforcement, investor protection, and quality of accounting standards. Our results suggest that greater economic freedom enhances equity value through more efficient management of investment options. 

Strategic Informed Trades, Diversification, and Expected Returns.

Strategic Informed Trades, Diversification, and Expected Returns.
TAR(2015)

Caskey, Judson
Hughes, John S.
Liu, Jun

这咋会是篇会计论文的？Finance和Econ更合适啊。
人们Strategic Trade对宏观经济的影响。Modeling Paper。
简介都看不懂。484在说那一小撮informed investors其实对市场expected returns and risk premium其实没啥影响？


We examine how strategic trade affects expected returns in a large economy. In our model, both a monopolist (strategic) informed trader and uninformed traders consider the impact of their demands on prices. In contrast to settings with price-taking traders, private information never eliminates a priced risk, and can lead to higher risk premiums. Also unlike settings with price-taking informed traders, risk premiums decrease in response to an increase in liquidity-motivated trades in diversified portfolios. These differing effects arise because a privately informed strategic trader conceals her trades by taking small positions relative to the magnitude of noise trades. Although prices partially reveal her information and reduce uncertainty, a concomitant decrease in her risk absorption dominates and leads to higher risk premiums. Similar to settings with price-taking traders, private information affects expected returns only via factor loadings and risk premiums on existing payoff risks--it introduces no new priced risks, and factor loadings (betas) explain all cross-sectional differences in expected returns.

The Effectiveness of Credit Rating Agency Monitoring: Evidence from Asset Securitizations.

The Effectiveness of Credit Rating Agency Monitoring: Evidence from Asset Securitizations.
TAR(2015)

Bonsall, Samuel
Koharki, Kevin2
Neamtiu, Monica

评级机构（在债券初始发行的评级）和对这些企业Monitoring的关联。
一开始，评级比较靠谱。
后来就呵呵哒了。

This study investigates how differences between the rating agencies' initial (at the date of debt issuance) and subsequent (post-issuance) monitoring incentives affect securitizing banks' rating accuracy. We hypothesize that the agencies have stronger incentives to monitor issuers when providing initial versus post-issuance ratings. We document that initial ratings are positively associated with off-balance sheet securitized assets and incrementally associated with on-balance sheet retained securities. However, subsequent ratings fail to capture current exposure to off-balance sheet securitizations. We also find that subsequent ratings reflect default risk less accurately than initial ratings. The subsequent ratings' responsiveness to default risk is worse when a bank has more off-balance sheet securitized assets. Collectively, our findings are consistent with lax post-issuance monitoring. They raise questions about the effectiveness of using ratings as an ongoing contracting mechanism and suggest that conclusions about rating accuracy could differ depending on whether researchers focus on initial versus post-issuance ratings.

Performance Target Revisions in Incentive Contracts: Do Information and Trust Reduce Ratcheting and the Ratchet Effect?

Performance Target Revisions in Incentive Contracts: Do Information and Trust Reduce Ratcheting and the Ratchet Effect?
TAR(2015)

Bol, Jasmijn C.
Lill, Jeremy B.

公司会不会根据CEO过去的业绩来调整他的target（目标业绩）呢？
三个Hypotheses：
(1) High performance relative to peers attenuates the extent to which targets are ratcheted.（高业绩）
(2) Greater environmental volatility attenuates the extent to which targets are ratcheted.（高Volatility）
(3) A high level of trust between the principal and the agent will reduce the extent to which targets are ratcheted.(信任)

In this study, we examine a setting where principals use past performance to annually revise performance targets, but do not fully incorporate the past performance information in their target revisions. We argue that this situation is driven by some principals and agents having an implicit agreement where the principal "allows" the agent to receive economic rents from positive performance-target deviations that are the result of superior effort or transitory gains by not revising targets upward, while the agent "accepts" target revisions by not restricting output when these revisions are the result of structural changes in the operation's true economic capacity. Although both the principal and the agent can benefit from an implicit agreement, we argue that for the implicit agreement to be maintainable, the principal either needs information on the cause of the performance-target deviation or there needs to be trust between the principal and the agent. Using archival data across multiple years and independent bank units, we find a pattern of ratchet attenuation and output restriction that is consistent with the existence of implicit agreements for those principal-agent dyads where information asymmetry is sufficiently reduced or mutual trust exists.

Auditor Industry Specialization and Evidence of Cost Efficiencies in Homogenous Industries.

Auditor Industry Specialization and Evidence of Cost Efficiencies in Homogenous Industries.
TAR(2015)

Bills, Kenneth L.
Jeter, Debra C.
Stein, Sarah E.

行业集中度比较高的话，审计效率高，所以费用低。
（咋算的homogenous？）

This study examines the audit pricing effects when auditors specialize in industries conducive to transferable audit processes. Our results indicate that industry specialists charge incrementally lower fees in industries with homogenous operations, and particularly in industries with both homogenous operations and complex accounting practices. Moreover, we discover that audit quality is no lower for clients audited by these specialists offering fee discounts, consistent with a conclusion that the reduction in fees indicates cost efficiencies rather than lower-quality audits. Further analysis indicates that the shared economies of scale only occur in a subsample of client firms with relatively high bargaining power. When considered in conjunction with prior research using a survivorship approach, our study provides evidence that certain industries lend themselves to specialization because auditors generate cost-based competitive advantages without compromising service quality.

Time Series Event Study of Management Forecasts (MF v1.0) - More Interesting

Analysis Variable : car
Range_desc	Guidance_code	MF_year	N Obs	N	Mean	t Value	Pr > |t|
between (&)	shortfall	2002	141	134	-0.0879203	-6.70	<.0001
		2003	3286	3143	-0.0531445	-27.62	<.0001
		2004	4414	4209	-0.0556624	-33.75	<.0001
		2005	4775	4518	-0.0508213	-37.66	<.0001
		2006	4976	4735	-0.0413169	-29.81	<.0001
		2007	5385	5152	-0.0409229	-29.77	<.0001
		2008	7518	7167	-0.0455477	-26.42	<.0001
		2009	5625	5414	-0.0290730	-17.93	<.0001
		2010	4902	4681	-0.0315479	-22.57	<.0001
		2011	5733	5527	-0.0336018	-23.01	<.0001
		2012	6828	6572	-0.0324841	-24.66	<.0001
		2013	6727	6469	-0.0256261	-22.02	<.0001
		2014	1934	1859	-0.0288105	-12.11	<.0001
	beat consensus	2001	2	1	-0.0017726	.	.
		2002	93	88	0.0399165	3.87	0.0002
		2003	2434	2324	0.0460118	21.16	<.0001
		2004	3638	3468	0.0341562	23.11	<.0001
		2005	3343	3173	0.0353568	23.86	<.0001
		2006	3633	3447	0.0366106	26.36	<.0001
		2007	3651	3476	0.0370392	24.00	<.0001
		2008	4514	4241	0.0386112	21.38	<.0001
		2009	4324	4124	0.0464362	24.49	<.0001
		2010	5837	5524	0.0307590	27.02	<.0001
		2011	4850	4602	0.0313495	21.25	<.0001
		2012	4485	4258	0.0348499	23.39	<.0001
		2013	4243	4066	0.0287937	19.78	<.0001
		2014	1072	1030	0.0289059	9.45	<.0001
	Match Consensus	2002	193	183	-0.0058938	-0.81	0.4199
		2003	5898	5611	0.0057823	5.17	<.0001
		2004	7638	7266	-0.000160427	-0.19	0.8510
		2005	7767	7356	0.0049093	6.24	<.0001
		2006	7780	7390	0.0043200	5.31	<.0001
		2007	8306	7860	0.0080441	9.42	<.0001
		2008	9538	9057	0.0095128	8.73	<.0001
		2009	7882	7491	0.0128382	11.27	<.0001
		2010	9534	9026	0.0027056	3.74	0.0002
		2011	9301	8892	0.0051716	6.08	<.0001
		2012	9707	9271	0.0086958	10.58	<.0001
		2013	9965	9561	0.0086726	12.17	<.0001
		2014	2343	2257	0.0092936	5.82	<.0001
	management guidance	2001	1	1	0.1264150	.	.
		2002	76	70	0.0122779	1.07	0.2886
		2003	1070	1018	-0.0026937	-0.64	0.5194
		2004	796	684	0.0017574	0.29	0.7738
		2005	639	482	-0.0031710	-0.49	0.6240
		2006	519	383	0.0037485	0.60	0.5473
		2007	503	381	-0.0179156	-2.88	0.0043
		2008	1067	919	0.0010758	0.21	0.8335
		2009	1205	1092	0.0199339	3.95	<.0001
		2010	1186	1046	0.0084357	2.23	0.0262
		2011	969	866	0.0117511	2.72	0.0066
		2012	1123	1015	0.0065651	1.82	0.0695
		2013	928	845	-0.0017280	-0.50	0.6201
		2014	193	184	0.0072252	0.62	0.5371
About	shortfall	2002	38	31	-0.0703282	-3.54	0.0013
		2003	466	435	-0.0606701	-11.78	<.0001
		2004	594	560	-0.0668099	-13.86	<.0001
		2005	511	488	-0.0690805	-13.11	<.0001
		2006	556	531	-0.0448856	-9.13	<.0001
		2007	779	718	-0.0307126	-8.92	<.0001
		2008	1559	1443	-0.0394905	-8.77	<.0001
		2009	1700	1592	-0.0168855	-4.85	<.0001
		2010	1082	1023	-0.0175754	-6.19	<.0001
		2011	1128	1055	-0.0319820	-8.85	<.0001
		2012	1334	1255	-0.0165181	-4.97	<.0001
		2013	1345	1280	-0.0180985	-7.39	<.0001
		2014	311	298	-0.0062353	-1.12	0.2631
	beat consensus	2002	14	13	0.0150043	0.81	0.4339
		2003	298	283	0.0408307	6.61	<.0001
		2004	539	504	0.0362392	8.22	<.0001
		2005	343	311	0.0544498	8.63	<.0001
		2006	325	306	0.0406301	7.50	<.0001
		2007	670	600	0.0194624	5.09	<.0001
		2008	1383	1272	0.0196394	5.66	<.0001
		2009	1174	1103	0.0299431	8.09	<.0001
		2010	1674	1568	0.0064988	3.25	0.0012
		2011	1554	1476	0.0107790	4.82	<.0001
		2012	1695	1595	0.0096230	4.59	<.0001
		2013	1738	1620	0.0069875	3.63	0.0003
		2014	468	444	0.0139052	4.09	<.0001
	Match Consensus	2002	65	65	-0.0101003	-1.27	0.2091
		2003	1674	1611	-0.0039667	-1.82	0.0689
		2004	2052	1934	0.000114271	0.06	0.9535
		2005	1851	1736	-0.0015865	-0.83	0.4081
		2006	1746	1636	0.0024591	1.18	0.2376
		2007	2444	2333	-0.0021895	-1.27	0.2046
		2008	3565	3413	0.0061189	3.08	0.0021
		2009	2828	2713	0.0132736	6.26	<.0001
		2010	3273	3129	0.0024471	1.87	0.0609
		2011	3312	3182	-0.000195038	-0.12	0.9031
		2012	3817	3639	0.0010401	0.72	0.4710
		2013	4459	4214	0.0020056	1.90	0.0569
		2014	1048	999	0.0085496	3.74	0.0002
	management guidance	2002	20	17	0.0290775	1.31	0.2091
		2003	271	249	0.0190555	1.82	0.0699
		2004	303	212	-0.0044855	-0.58	0.5595
		2005	216	126	-0.0011805	-0.10	0.9218
		2006	360	202	-0.0051174	-0.50	0.6169
		2007	358	211	-0.0022476	-0.28	0.7807
		2008	759	664	0.0222988	2.98	0.0030
		2009	931	831	0.0130307	2.16	0.0309
		2010	817	698	-0.0018499	-0.48	0.6299
		2011	623	548	0.0037315	0.65	0.5191
		2012	631	550	0.000209576	0.04	0.9645
		2013	512	476	-0.0033698	-0.81	0.4192
		2014	92	83	-0.0050524	-0.63	0.5275
more than	beat consensus	2002	4	4	0.0368926	1.09	0.3560
		2003	72	67	0.0538153	5.25	<.0001
		2004	159	142	0.0262697	3.87	0.0002
		2005	95	87	0.0416025	4.54	<.0001
		2006	133	119	0.0463969	5.68	<.0001
		2007	150	141	0.0437622	4.73	<.0001
		2008	229	220	0.0235027	3.17	0.0017
		2009	152	140	0.0253444	1.84	0.0674
		2010	231	209	0.0323540	5.29	<.0001
		2011	180	155	0.0283745	3.94	0.0001
		2012	143	130	0.0263124	3.33	0.0011
		2013	98	94	0.0161008	1.68	0.0959
		2014	24	24	0.0426152	2.43	0.0233
	management guidance	2002	4	4	-0.1266227	-3.42	0.0417
		2003	215	207	0.0189317	2.39	0.0177
		2004	397	346	-0.000699431	-0.10	0.9195
		2005	278	216	0.0122012	1.96	0.0510
		2006	390	311	-0.0034214	-0.65	0.5149
		2007	298	250	0.000548926	0.10	0.9206
		2008	409	393	-0.0012864	-0.22	0.8248
		2009	235	224	-0.0074171	-1.12	0.2619
		2010	314	291	-0.0016423	-0.34	0.7344
		2011	368	335	0.0070168	1.07	0.2875
		2012	276	238	-0.0021505	-0.41	0.6838
		2013	164	150	0.0015027	0.30	0.7684
		2014	38	35	0.0064594	0.52	0.6033
at least	beat consensus	2002	9	9	0.0358720	0.62	0.5517
		2003	142	138	0.0325256	4.00	0.0001
		2004	113	110	0.0168656	2.39	0.0186
		2005	89	86	0.0559389	3.96	0.0002
		2006	79	78	0.0515213	4.61	<.0001
		2007	41	41	0.0220988	2.30	0.0265
		2008	59	59	0.0499156	4.29	<.0001
		2009	55	55	0.0529231	3.54	0.0008
		2010	52	51	0.0412977	3.22	0.0022
		2011	78	74	0.0343938	2.63	0.0104
		2012	62	61	0.0198908	1.68	0.0988
		2013	51	51	0.0521835	2.78	0.0076
		2014	12	12	0.0561288	1.76	0.1064
	management guidance	2002	15	15	-0.0868953	-2.08	0.0565
		2003	199	181	-0.0085700	-1.03	0.3031
		2004	150	144	-0.0055840	-0.89	0.3739
		2005	145	129	-0.000081027	-0.01	0.9883
		2006	131	121	-0.0330993	-3.38	0.0010
		2007	132	115	-0.0068348	-0.88	0.3797
		2008	141	130	-0.0127228	-1.15	0.2503
		2009	73	73	-0.0144499	-1.14	0.2583
		2010	108	107	-0.0133360	-1.45	0.1503
		2011	114	110	-0.0076184	-1.08	0.2814
		2012	101	96	-0.0133860	-1.31	0.1919
		2013	111	108	-0.0021024	-0.38	0.7049
		2014	35	30	0.0513029	2.41	0.0225
high end of	shortfall	2003	13	12	0.0100412	0.84	0.4171
		2004	14	14	0.0081646	0.37	0.7178
		2005	20	20	0.0119601	1.19	0.2503
		2006	34	34	0.0106398	0.98	0.3354
		2007	22	20	0.0027239	0.18	0.8581
		2008	2	2	0.0587175	1.49	0.3767
		2009	9	9	-0.0046523	-0.19	0.8528
		2010	48	45	0.000150400	0.02	0.9825
		2011	32	32	0.0032157	0.32	0.7481
	beat consensus	2002	2	1	0.0068577	.	.
		2003	6	6	0.0291891	2.08	0.0924
		2004	8	8	-0.0148976	-0.47	0.6519
		2005	7	7	0.0271829	1.01	0.3500
		2006	6	6	0.0342082	2.12	0.0878
		2007	6	5	-0.0218258	-1.22	0.2907
		2009	3	2	0.0304697	0.71	0.6057
		2010	9	7	0.0241303	0.91	0.3996
		2011	6	6	-0.0049838	-0.30	0.7766
	Match Consensus	2002	3	3	0.1060975	2.89	0.1015
		2003	75	73	0.0248164	3.03	0.0034
		2004	106	103	0.0139907	1.79	0.0765
		2005	85	81	0.0303685	3.78	0.0003
		2006	111	104	0.0166235	2.19	0.0308
		2007	88	87	0.0301313	3.93	0.0002
		2008	9	9	0.0824971	2.37	0.0454
		2009	38	37	-0.0094550	-0.93	0.3586
		2010	124	117	-0.000578011	-0.10	0.9191
		2011	101	100	0.0143044	2.55	0.0122
	management guidance	2003	4	4	0.0521226	3.08	0.0540
		2004	3	3	0.1058329	3.25	0.0831
		2005	2	1	-0.0476492	.	.
		2006	4	3	0.0111695	0.24	0.8294
		2007	3	3	0.0873855	0.84	0.4902
		2009	1	1	0.0063479	.	.
		2010	1	1	0.0445301	.	.
		2011	3	2	0.0083777	0.30	0.8153
low end of	shortfall	2003	7	7	-0.0897668	-2.33	0.0583
		2004	6	6	-0.1109615	-2.56	0.0510
		2005	9	7	-0.0476084	-3.55	0.0121
		2006	7	7	-0.0314106	-1.21	0.2724
		2007	5	5	-0.0287181	-1.92	0.1266
		2010	9	8	-0.0162018	-1.28	0.2419
		2011	9	9	-0.0422691	-1.59	0.1497
	beat consensus	2003	19	17	-0.0080930	-0.76	0.4558
		2004	8	8	-0.0354652	-1.97	0.0891
		2005	14	13	-0.0625569	-1.81	0.0955
		2006	23	21	-0.0221593	-1.53	0.1423
		2007	16	14	-0.0108764	-0.47	0.6469
		2009	8	7	-0.0017317	-0.09	0.9276
		2010	14	13	-0.0257187	-0.85	0.4095
		2011	15	13	-0.0126097	-0.76	0.4623
		2012	1	1	0.0588459	.	.
	Match Consensus	2002	5	5	-0.1003224	-1.52	0.2024
		2003	90	89	-0.0164248	-2.62	0.0104
		2004	76	75	-0.0220669	-2.52	0.0138
		2005	86	83	-0.0384681	-6.32	<.0001
		2006	76	75	-0.0322083	-3.99	0.0002
		2007	78	73	-0.0268515	-4.29	<.0001
		2008	6	6	0.0364370	0.78	0.4725
		2009	22	20	0.000622043	0.05	0.9589
		2010	79	73	-0.0201271	-2.05	0.0441
		2011	67	64	-0.0250826	-2.28	0.0262
		2012	1	1	-0.0504291	.	.
	management guidance	2002	3	2	-0.0659798	-0.91	0.5314
		2003	1	1	-0.0210314	.	.
		2004	1	1	-0.0277601	.	.
		2005	1	1	-0.0476492	.	.
		2006	3	1	-0.0619647	.	.
		2009	7	7	0.0388989	1.79	0.1240
		2010	4	4	-0.0269680	-1.05	0.3727
		2011	5	5	0.0143403	1.41	0.2303
less than	shortfall	2002	2	2	-0.2492690	-2.04	0.2896
		2003	44	43	-0.0765933	-3.57	0.0009
		2004	53	50	-0.1125855	-5.76	<.0001
		2005	24	21	-0.0554584	-2.69	0.0140
		2006	51	51	-0.1068403	-6.15	<.0001
		2007	43	40	-0.0331670	-1.60	0.1182
		2008	63	62	-0.0171928	-0.83	0.4076
		2009	120	117	-0.0013854	-0.12	0.9022
		2010	42	42	0.0063224	0.45	0.6551
		2011	35	34	-0.0407430	-2.16	0.0379
		2012	46	44	0.0138384	0.52	0.6063
		2013	18	17	-0.0248218	-1.26	0.2251
		2014	3	3	0.0969718	1.16	0.3651
	management guidance	2002	3	3	-0.0765650	-1.09	0.3896
		2003	107	97	-0.0766446	-3.99	0.0001
		2004	131	108	-0.0425629	-3.38	0.0010
		2005	40	35	-0.0606610	-4.68	<.0001
		2006	65	57	0.0145231	0.56	0.5782
		2007	63	59	-0.0219022	-1.69	0.0970
		2008	109	102	-0.0145118	-1.02	0.3110
		2009	198	182	0.0124204	1.34	0.1805
		2010	91	87	-0.0026636	-0.28	0.7781
		2011	57	53	-0.0248631	-1.83	0.0724
		2012	44	41	-0.0102761	-0.60	0.5540
		2013	23	22	0.0094842	0.44	0.6610
		2014	10	9	-0.0163642	-0.81	0.4417
may exceed	management guidance	2003	15	14	0.0630778	1.86	0.0864
		2004	27	27	-0.000799239	-0.04	0.9681
		2005	20	19	0.0434456	1.60	0.1273
		2006	29	27	0.0357082	1.86	0.0739
		2007	19	17	-0.0280927	-1.04	0.3143
		2008	1	1	0.0649613	.	.
		2009	1	1	0.1396662	.	.
		2012	2	2	0.0937953	.	.
slightly more than	beat consensus	2003	6	6	0.0539462	1.63	0.1648
		2004	8	8	0.0275509	0.50	0.6315
		2005	6	6	0.0410034	1.09	0.3258
		2006	24	23	0.0079798	0.43	0.6738
		2007	22	21	0.0421457	1.94	0.0668
		2008	21	20	0.0238637	0.88	0.3917
		2009	28	28	-0.0135228	-0.48	0.6349
		2010	13	13	0.0149574	0.69	0.5051
		2011	17	17	0.0170830	0.90	0.3802
		2012	11	10	0.0415956	1.60	0.1445
		2013	16	15	-0.0312621	-1.51	0.1540
		2014	2	2	0.0078805	.	.
	management guidance	2002	1	1	-0.0192872	.	.
		2003	19	18	-0.0128414	-0.72	0.4801
		2004	35	34	-0.0176605	-1.41	0.1686
		2005	22	21	-0.0110827	-0.52	0.6061
		2006	48	45	-0.0037229	-0.25	0.8060
		2007	37	32	-0.0192581	-1.37	0.1801
		2008	31	29	-0.0295155	-1.05	0.3034
		2009	25	24	0.0352387	1.29	0.2110
		2010	19	18	-0.0060039	-0.28	0.7809
		2011	26	25	-0.0110868	-1.15	0.2622
		2012	30	30	-0.0024941	-0.21	0.8313
		2013	20	20	-0.000417743	-0.02	0.9820
		2014	8	8	0.0182488	1.00	0.3502
slightly less than	shortfall	2003	10	9	-0.0306437	-2.49	0.0374
		2004	11	9	-0.0760783	-2.76	0.0246
		2005	14	14	-0.0328376	-2.53	0.0254
		2006	16	16	-0.0536728	-2.59	0.0206
		2007	17	17	0.0068911	0.31	0.7598
		2008	15	14	-0.0451151	-1.61	0.1308
		2009	18	18	-0.0358690	-1.57	0.1356
		2010	11	9	-0.0033951	-0.18	0.8634
		2011	11	11	-0.0489571	-1.95	0.0794
		2012	7	7	-0.0046360	-0.30	0.7765
		2013	6	6	0.0089643	0.42	0.6949
		2014	3	3	0.0538494	1.53	0.2657
	management guidance	2003	8	8	0.0106428	0.42	0.6841
		2004	17	17	0.0062139	0.47	0.6426
		2005	8	8	0.0037419	0.14	0.8948
		2006	26	23	-0.0091800	-0.54	0.5973
		2007	15	15	0.0177895	0.90	0.3813
		2008	20	18	0.0754633	2.68	0.0160
		2009	15	15	-0.0081297	-0.79	0.4423
		2010	9	9	-0.0057008	-0.63	0.5487
		2011	10	10	0.0121850	0.41	0.6882
		2012	15	15	-0.0169043	-0.28	0.7871
		2013	9	8	0.0281801	1.13	0.2957
		2014	3	3	-0.0407768	-1.93	0.1929
comfortable with	shortfall	2003	1	1	0.2060227	.	.
		2004	2	2	-0.0688440	-0.89	0.5354
		2005	2	2	0.0950537	8.48	0.0747
		2006	5	5	0.0057759	0.67	0.5418
		2007	2	2	0.0347266	1.11	0.4663
		2008	3	3	0.0195916	0.52	0.6565
	beat consensus	2003	7	7	-0.0017051	-0.16	0.8806
		2004	1	1	-0.0425753	.	.
		2005	1	1	0.0180696	.	.
		2007	2	1	0.5329565	.	.
		2009	2	2	0.0163971	1.33	0.4112
		2010	1	1	-0.0342055	.	.
	Match Consensus	2002	15	15	0.0074009	0.70	0.4983
		2003	227	217	-0.0025939	-0.69	0.4940
		2004	105	104	0.0079784	1.49	0.1399
		2005	82	82	0.0021527	0.36	0.7166
		2006	46	46	0.0105507	1.14	0.2622
		2007	39	37	0.0096697	0.95	0.3461
		2008	26	26	0.0020553	0.13	0.9006
		2009	7	7	0.0503623	1.47	0.1922
		2010	4	4	-0.0205029	-2.33	0.1019
		2011	1	1	-0.0076378	.	.
		2013	3	3	-0.0295361	-0.98	0.4309
	management guidance	2002	1	1	-0.0498957	.	.
		2003	3	3	-0.0158470	-1.18	0.3597
		2005	1	0	.	.	.
		2006	6	0	.	.	.
		2007	14	8	-0.0700252	-1.64	0.1448
		2009	2	2	0.0608127	2.89	0.2122
significantly less than	shortfall	2003	1	1	-0.0768066	.	.
		2004	2	2	0.0055141	16.12	0.0394
		2005	15	9	-0.0601718	-3.51	0.0079
		2006	8	6	-0.0788691	-0.95	0.3846
		2007	3	2	-0.2449272	-1.35	0.4065
		2008	2	2	-0.1942644	.	.
		2011	1	1	-0.2840062	.	.
	management guidance	2002	1	1	-0.1032307	.	.
		2003	8	8	-0.0731269	-3.48	0.0103
		2004	5	5	-0.1651474	-3.49	0.0251
		2005	19	17	-0.0909307	-2.08	0.0535
		2006	7	7	-0.0200116	-0.43	0.6841
		2008	7	5	0.0080312	0.17	0.8698
		2009	1	1	-0.0670754	.	.
		2011	1	1	0.0755915	.	.
		2012	2	2	-0.0669766	-2.44	0.2480
significantly more than	beat consensus	2003	2	1	0.0609062	.	.
		2004	3	3	0.0810591	2.35	0.1437
		2005	1	1	0.0638046	.	.
		2006	3	3	0.0566360	1.92	0.1951
		2007	1	1	0.0670833	.	.
		2008	1	1	-0.0176611	.	.
	management guidance	2002	1	1	0.0202071	.	.
		2003	9	9	0.0468077	0.86	0.4129
		2004	9	9	-0.0225441	-0.83	0.4318
		2005	10	8	0.0105702	0.28	0.7906
		2006	17	12	0.0286718	1.38	0.1942
		2007	2	2	0.0503826	1.21	0.4397
		2008	1	1	-0.0317099	.	.
		2009	2	2	0.2869853	2.57	0.2365
		2011	1	1	-0.2840062	.	.
		2012	1	1	-0.0866493	.	.
not to exceed	shortfall	2008	9	9	0.0671104	1.18	0.2736
		2009	14	14	-0.0171058	-0.58	0.5736
		2010	3	3	-0.0103960	-0.42	0.7129
		2012	2	1	-0.0937879	.	.
	management guidance	2007	1	1	0.1570761	.	.
		2008	4	4	-0.0113196	-0.28	0.7983
		2009	40	38	0.0065399	0.23	0.8202
		2010	13	13	-0.0146883	-0.74	0.4754
		2011	9	9	-0.0396882	-0.96	0.3670
		2012	6	6	0.0269567	0.49	0.6436
		2013	6	6	0.0235950	0.82	0.4495
		2014	1	1	-0.0179100	.	.